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Credit Rating Agencies’ Ratings in Debt Default Models 
Sovereign credit ratings and their associated default probabilities have historically been used by 
leading international banks for determining their capital allocation in a particular country, pricing 
of sovereign bonds and loans and, most importantly, as an input to their credit risk management 
models. Such credit ratings and default probabilities are traditionally provided by the leading 
credit rating agencies (CRAs). According to the Basel Capital Accord – Basel II, banks were 
allowed to use their internal sovereign ratings and/or CRA’s ratings and their associated default 
rates in determining their required regulatory capital against credit risk. When this is applied to 
emerging markets, due to the lack of data on sovereigns, the sovereign credit ratings are mainly 
based on corporate defaults, assuming the latter is a good proxy for the former. However, 
corporations and governments are fundamentally different borrowers both in terms of their legal 
status and solvency, making this assumption doubtful. Therefore, in this Chapter that draws upon 
a recently published article “Sovereign Rescheduling Probabilities in Emerging Markets: A 
Comparison with Credit Rating Agencies’ Ratings”1, we assess whether country default 
probabilities derived from the empirical models we specifically designed for sovereigns, are 
more appropriate measures of sovereign default than CRAs’ corporate default rates. Specifically, 
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in search of the most accurate approach to predicting sovereign debt rescheduling, we compare 
the real-world probabilities estimated using historical data in our models with the assigned 
probabilities of three major international rating agencies, namely, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) and Fitch. Basing our probabilities of sovereign default on models using 124 emerging 
countries over the period 1981-2002, we show that CRA’s underestimate sovereign debt default 
probabilities which brings into question banks’/investors’ reliance on the CRA’s credit ratings.  
Debt Rescheduling Probability Model 
When deriving a model that would be specific for estimation of sovereign default probabilities in 
emerging markets, one needs to be aware that potentially large a number of economic, political 
and market factors determine the extent of a country's debt repayment difficulties. Sovereign 
default may be caused by a country’s politically motivated unwillingness to repay their external 
debt or simply by inability stemming from insolvency and/or illiquidity. Solvency is often 
measured by the GDP, government revenues or exports and it also depends on the exchange rate 
regime (an overvaluation of currency can lead to external imbalances and hence to accumulation 
of debt). Macroeconomic factors such as inflation and money growth affect foreign investors’ 
risk attitude: for instance, an increase in inflation would inversely affect the amount of foreign 
capital invested in a country. Illiquidity, as another variable contributing to a country’s inability 
to repay its debt, is usually measured by the Short-term debt to Reserves or M2 to Reserves. 
Moreover, political and institutional factors are very important determinants of probability of 
default as they affect country’s stability and debt repayment policies. Further, financial ratios 
that have most commonly been identified in literature as significant determinants of probability 
of sovereign default are: Reserves to Imports (e.g., Aylward and Thorne, 1998); Total External 
Debt to GDP (e.g., Balkan, 1992, Detragiache and Spilmbergo, 2000 etc.); and Total Debt 
Service Payment to Exports (e.g., Solberg, 1988 and Rivoli and Brewer, 1997). Finally, it has 
been documented that a country’s past debt repayment record can be used as an excellent 
indicator of their current likelihood to default. The list of variables that could potentially affect 
sovereign default presented here is not exhaustive, so for more detailed review of these and other 
variables see Georgievska et al. (2008). To select the most appropriate variables out of a large 
pool, which could be used in building an empirical model for estimating probability of sovereign 
default, we deploy the Principal Component Analysis technique. Our selection method2 leads us 
Sovereign Debt Rescheduling  
 3 
to adopt variables that can be grouped into four main categories and are expected to have either 
positive or negative impact on probability of rescheduling as described in Table ZZZ.1:  
 
Table ZZZ.1: The impact of selected variables on the probability of default/recheduling 
 
Variables 
Impact of the increase in value of the variable on 
probability of default/recheduling 
Positive Negative 
Past rescheduling record:   
Lagged Rescheduling x  
Political Variable:  
ICRG Rating(a)  
(50% political, 25% financial and 25% economic risk) 
  
x 
Solvency variables:  
Total Debt/GNP x  
Arrears/Exports x  
Exports/GDP  x 
Liquidity Variables:  
 International Reserves/GDP  x 
Macroeconomic variables:  
Current Account Balance/GDP  x 
Imports/GDP (b) ambiguous ambiguous 
(a)  A higher number, obtained as a weighted average of points assigned for political, economic and financial risk of a country, indicates the lower 
potential risk and vice versa. 
(b) When the imports in relation to the GDP are higher, the country is more vulnerable to foreign shocks, and more likely to external debt 
rescheduling (Frenkel, 1983). However, (Odedokun, 1995) argues that the higher this ratio, the more open the economy is, which in effect 
reduces the probability of default. 
 
The event of debt default/rescheduling is defined as a binary variable: 
                        01  
In our sample there were 519 debt defaults/reschedulings3  in total. Although 22 countries had no 
defaults in this period, some, for example Gabon, Zambia, Tanzania and Nicaragua faced a 
dozen or more default/rescheduling events.  
 
Applying the panel logit models, traditionally used in this setting, we estimated the probabilities 
of sovereign default in emerging market countries in our sample. In search for the most accurate 
model we considered those which: 1) maximise percent of correct predictions (that the default 
had occurred) and 2) minimise the ‘false negatives’, i.e. minimise the error that the actual 
defaults are classified by the model as non-defaults (known as Type I error). Using the variables 
if country i reschedules its external debt in year t, i.e. if its total 
amount of debt recheduled is above zero in year t  
if country i does not reschedule its external debt in year t 
 
Rechedulingit 
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described earlier, we have derived two models that satisfy criterion 1) and 2) respectively and 
give us empirical estimates of debt rescheduling probabilities in emerging markets. Specifically, 
Model 1, which included Prior Rescheduling Event (over the past one year), Total debt/GNP, 
Exports/GDP, Current Account Balance/GDP and International reserves/GDP, gave us 82.68% 
of correct predictions of actual defaults and 9.13% Type I error.  Model 2, which, in addition to 
Past Rescheduling and Total debt/GDP, included the political variable (ICRG index), 
Arrears/Exports and Imports/GDP had 82.54% correct predictions and 8.33% Type I error. 
Overall, our determinants of debt rescheduling suggest that in order to reduce their probability of 
default/rescheduling and get better access to international capital markets, emerging countries 
should: maintain a good past debt repayment record; reduce their current account deficit; 
improve their political stability; increase their exports relative to imports; keep close control of 
international reserves relative to GDP (which is of particular relevance for countries with 
underdeveloped banking system); and limit the size of the external debt compared to their 
resource base (GNP).  
 
Empirical vs. CRAs Probabilities of Emerging Markets Sovereign Debt Recheduling  
A direct comparison between empirical one-year default probabilities from our Models 1 and 2 
and the one-year sovereign credit ratings from Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch cannot 
be done, as the CRAs use letter ratings that range from AAA (for S&P and Fitch, Aaa for 
Moody’s) to C, while our models provide quantitative probability of default. To enable this 
comparison, we use transformation of letter ratings into their associated one-year cumulative 
default probabilities (or ranges of default probabilities)4. More specifically, to derive one-year 
cumulative default probabilities, all three CRAs use periods of up to 20 years. For instance, 
credit rating of B1 corresponds to the average one-year cumulative default rate of 2%, which 
represents the percentage of historical number of debtors that have defaulted within one year of 
being assigned rating B1, within a total number of countries and companies with B1 rating over 
the same one year period. The year selected for comparison is the final year in our sample, 2002, 
when, at the beginning of the year, 42 countries have been rated by the three CRAs.   
 
Striking findings emerged from the comparison of empirical vs. CRAs probabilities of default: 
95.59% of the countries rated by Moody’s, 85.71% of those rated by S&P and 96.3% of Fitch 
rated countries had lower one-year cumulative default probabilities than equivalents generated 
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by our Model 1 (corresponding numbers of comparison with Model 2 are 97.3%, 88.57 and 
92.59%). Table ZZ.2 sets out the default/rescheduling probabilities derived from our models 
along with CRAs’ one-year cumulative default probabilities, focusing at the sample of nine 
countries that have actually rescheduled/defaulted in 2002.   
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Table ZZ.2: Model 1 and Model 2 One-Year Default/Reschediling Probabilities vs. CRAs’ One-Year Default Rate in 2002: sample of 
countries that has actually defaulted/recheduled 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: --- Indicates that the data is not available (countries are not rated)
Country That 
Has Defaulted  
In 2002 
Model 1 
Default 
Probabilities 
Model 2 
Default 
Probabilities 
Moody's associated 
Default Probability  
S&P's associated 
Default Probability  
Fitch's associated 
Default Probability  
Moody's 
Rating 
S&P 
Rating 
Fitch 
Rating 
Bolivia 12.90% 14.09% 2.00% 2.63 - 3.33% --- B1 B+ --- 
Honduras 46.33% 58.62% 6.81% --- --- B2 --- --- 
Indonesia 66.63% 76.43% 6.86% 100.00% 1.68 - 21.97% B3 CCC B- 
Jordan 36.29% 48.18% 1.58% 2.63 - 3.33% --- Ba3 BB-  
Mexico 7.83% 6.89% 1.78% 0.00 - 2.63% 0.27 – 1.55% Baa3 BB+ BB+ 
Moldova 8.65% 9.12% 13.95% --- 21.97% Caa1 --- CC 
Nicaragua 76.25% 85.31% 6.81% --- --- B2 --- --- 
Pakistan 65.88% 70.98% 13.95% 3.33 - 100% --- Caa1 B- --- 
Russian Federation 61.73% 55.17% 1.58% 2.63 - 3.33% 1.55 – 1.68% Ba3 B+ B+ 
Sovereign Debt Rescheduling  
 7 
For majority of the selected countries, the one-year cumulative default rates implied from their 
CRAs ratings at the beginning of 2002 are very low, mostly being well below 10%, giving no signal 
of potential default (the exception is Indonesia, for which the S&P correctly assigns 100% 
probability of default). Conversely, most of the default probabilities generated by our empirical 
models were above 50% (particularly when Model 2 is taken into consideration), indicating that 
rescheduling is likely to occur. For instance, in the case of Nicaragua, Model 1 and Model 2 give 
very high default probabilities of 76.25% and 85.31% respectively, while Moody’s assigns it a B2 
rating and associated cumulative default probability of only 6.81%. This and further analysis in 
Georgievska et al. (2008), leads us to conclude that CRAs did not effectively predict 2002 
defaults/reschedulings. That is not to say that empirical models are always correct. If some empirical 
models (and CRAs) use past rescheduling/default event as one of the determinants of probability of 
default, then, a country that has defaulted in the recent past (upto one year ago) may be classified by 
empirical models (and some CRAs) as ‘likely to default’ in the next period. However, in reality, one 
default does not have to follow another. The example of Argentina (which defaulted in 2001, but not 
in 2002 despite the predictions of default from our empirical models and all CRAs but Fitch) bares 
this out.  
 
One of the reasons why  CRAs’ default rates are underestimating emerging countries sovereign 
defaults over one-year horizon lies in the fact that CRAs sovereign ratings are mainly based on 
historical corporate default rates (the exception are Fitch’s ratings, which specifically follow 
sovereign defaults). Given that characteristics of borrowers in each case are very different 
(government vs. corporation), corporate bonds credit ratings and their associated default 
probabilities generally do not appear to be good proxies for sovereign default probabilities.  
 
Implications 
It is well known that leading banks and international investors rely on sovereign default probabilities 
to estimate credit risk exposure in one country, price sovereign bonds and loans and decide upon 
country capital allocation. However, using CRAs default probabilities for this purpose may have 
serious implications for both banks and countries in question, as their problems may outweigh the 
benefits. For instance, CRAs continuous underestimation of sovereign default risk for emerging 
countries will cause underestimation of credit risk for banks, under-pricing of sovereign bonds and 
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loans and increasing capital allocation to emerging countries with underestimated probabilities of 
default. Therefore, if an actual default of a sovereign occurs, it is likely that CRAs will downgrade 
the country rating very quickly. Then, the banks may experience difficulties in reducing the amount 
of capital allocation in these (now riskier) countries. Nevertheless, the capital outflows will be 
imminent under such circumstances. Once the considerable amount of foreign capital is withdrawn 
from a downgraded country, its fundamentals are likely to deteriorate further, leading subsequently 
to the new downgrades by CRAs and deepening of the crisis.   
 
Finally, although this article favours the use sovereign debt default probabilities from empirical 
models and historical data over those provided by the CRAs, it is important to draw the attention of 
the reader to the cost of applying each method, which varies with the size of investors. Large 
financial institutions already have the analytical set-up needed for obtaining and processing the data 
required for the empirical models, so, in that case, the information cost of generating their own 
sovereign default probabilities is marginal. For individual investors, who by and large do not have 
adequate analytical frameworks in place, the cost advantage lies with the existing (readily available) 
CRAs default probabilities, but - as this article suggests – these should be used with caution.   
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ENDNOTES: 
                                                 
1
 For more details please refer to Georgievska et. al. (2008) 
2
 The following were the selection criteria: (a) the variables are individually and jointly significant in the econometric 
model; (b) the coefficients on the variables included in the model show their expected sign; and (c) the variables 
included optimize the fit of the model.  
3
 Data obtained from the World Bank Global Development Finance  
4
 Data obtained from:  Moody's Investors Service, 2003, "Default & Recovery Rates of Corporate Bond Issuers: A 
Statistical Review of Moody's Ratings Performance, 1920-2002", Special Comment, February (New York, Moody's 
Investor Service);  Standard and Poor's , 2002, "Sovereign Ratings 2001:The Best of Times, The Worst of Times", 
Sovereigns, April (New York, Standard and Poor's); Fitch Ratings, 2002, "Fitch Corporate Finance 2002 Rating 
Migration and Default Study", Corporate Finance, (New York, Fitch Ratings)  
